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Abstract 
 Miller’s (1956) article about storage capacity limits, “The magical number seven plus or 
minus two…,” is one of the best-known articles in psychology.  Though influential in several 
ways, for about 40 years it was oddly followed by rather little research on the numerical limit of 
capacity in working memory, or on the relation between three potentially related phenomena that 
Miller described. Given that the article was written in a humorous tone and was framed around a 
tongue-in-cheek premise (persecution by an integer), I argue that it may have inadvertently 
stymied progress on these topics as researchers attempted to avoid ridicule. This commentary 
relates some correspondence with Miller on his article and concludes with a call to avoid self-
censorship of our less conventional ideas.  
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George Miller’s Magical Number of Immediate Memory in Retrospect: 
Observations on the Faltering Progression of Science 
 
How did it come about that a widely-cited work on a subject of fundamental and obvious 
interest could halt some areas of research rather than inspire them?  I would argue that the 
famous article of George Miller (1956) on “the magical number seven plus or minus two” did 
just that.  It was followed by a 40-year hiatus of work on the topic of item capacity limits in 
working memory.  It seems a paradox for such a widely cited and esteemed source to inspire 
little closely-related follow-up work for such a long period.  I will explore the situation, partly 
based on published sources and partly based on my own e-mail communications in 2000 with 
Miller, who died in 2012 (APS Observer, 2012; Pinker, 2013; Vitello, 2012). 
One of the key concepts in the field of cognitive science is that of working memory, often 
called short-term memory or immediate memory, terms that all refer to the temporarily 
heightened availability of information about a small number of recent events and thoughts.  The 
terms have somewhat different connotations and detailed meanings, but these are inconsistent 
among investigators and unimportant for the present purposes.  Google Scholar lists over 2.5 
million entries for these three phrases.  The concept of immediate memory was made popular by 
George A. Miller’s (1956) article on capacity limits in information processing, suggesting that it 
is limited to about seven units.  It is one of the best-known works in the cognitive and 
psychological sciences, with about 20,000 scientific citations as of this writing (17 October, 
2014).  Its wider popular appeal is illustrated in a Google search for the key phrase from the 
article’s title, the magical number seven (or 7), which yielded about 873,000 results. Yet, for 
over 40 years, there was very little follow-up research on the specific processing limitations 
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mentioned in the article.  During most of that time, emphasis of the field shifted away from the 
item limits that Miller discussed, toward limits in the persistence or decay of items across time, 
and toward interference between items based on their similarity, rather than on capacity limits 
(following the seminal lead of Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  The investigation of item limits finally 
picked up again with a surge of research on visual working memory item limits after groundwork 
by Luck & Vogel (1997) and renewed interest based on a reappraisal of the limits in various 
domains (Baddeley, 2000, 2001; Cowan, 1999, 2001).  Currently, research on item limits is 
thriving (e.g., see Cowan, Rouder, Blume, & Saults, 2012; Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014).   
During the 40-year hiatus there were, to be sure, important works that made use of an 
item limit in working memory in order to model the human information processing system at 
large (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Broadbent, 1958).  Most often, though, the authors fit or 
explained their data by assuming a somewhat smaller capacity limit of closer to 4 items (for a 
review see Cowan, 2001).  Yet, no one denies that adult humans typically can repeat, without 
error, lists of up to about 7 items, such as random words or digits.  Given such discrepancies, it 
has often been suggested that items capacity limits are highly task-specific or “just depend” on 
the circumstances. 
Why did the field settle for such a vague pronouncement for so long rather than 
investigating the discrepancies directly?  The hiatus in research on this topic may stem largely 
from the manner in which Miller (1956) wrote his famous article.  To explain this, I will review 
the article briefly and then will describe his autobiographical remarks about how it was written, 
finally extracting some lessons from these remarks for the pursuit of science.   
Description of Miller (1956) 
In the 1956 article, Miller said he was persecuted by an integer:  7. He reviewed his own 
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work along with other work in the current literature, discussing three kinds of tasks in which 
human abilities are shown to be limited to about 7 things.  (1) In absolute judgment (or absolute 
identification) tasks, individuals experience one stimulus at a time and must indicate the category 
to which the stimulus belongs.  Examples of simple stimuli include tones of different frequencies 
(perceived as different pitches) and lines of different lengths.  The response to each stimulus is to 
be made in terms of arbitrary category labels provided by the experimenter (e.g., 1-10) that the 
participant has learned in a training phase.  The basic finding is that participants can effectively 
use only about 5 to 9 different categories, that is, 7 plus or minus two as in the article’s title.  The 
limit was thought to be expressed in binary choices or bits, in line with thinking of the day in 
which the conception of human processing was influenced by the blossoming field of computers 
(e.g., Newell & Simon, 1956).  (2) A second type of task with a limit, the one remembered best 
by the public, was for memory span, the maximal length of a random word list that could be 
recalled with the items in order.  Again, the answer was that roughly 7 items could be recalled in 
normal adults, give or take a few.  Here, however, it was clear that the result could not be 
expressed in binary choices.  People can remember lists of about 7 digits, letters, or words even 
though the response choices include 10 digits, 26 letters in English, and many thousands of 
words.  Miller offered the concept of a chunk or unit of information that is coherent to the 
participant, suggesting that the limit of memory was about seven familiar chunks.  For example, 
the letter string FBICIAUSA can be remembered without much difficulty if it is parsed into 3 
chunks, each of which is an acronym representing an American agency if you know it:  FBI, 
CIA, and USA.  This idea about chunks, rather than the limit to about 7 items, may be the most 
important specific contribution of the article.  (3) In the third type of task, which is known as 
subitizing, it was suggested that people can quickly assess, without counting, the number of 
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simple objects in a collection of up to about 7, but no more (e.g., a very early study in which a 
handful of beans was dropped in a heap onto a table to be estimated:  Jevons, 1871).  Miller 
concluded his grand review with a question as to why these limits are similar, and with the 
answer that the similarity is probably coincidental. 
Autobiographical Account of Miller (1956) 
The retrospective account offered by Miller (1989) indicates that the 1956 article was 
based on a public address that he had to be cajoled into giving to the Eastern Psychological 
Association.  He did not think that his two lines of research, on absolute judgments and memory 
span, provided the basis for a coherent hour-long address, and initially declined the invitation.  
Following the organizer’s persistence, he accepted the invitation when he realized that he could 
knit his findings into a story about their commonality:  the number of bits of capacity in absolute 
judgment amounted to about 7 categories, similar to the number of chunks making up the limit in 
memory span.  To make the story even better, he threw in the newly-awakening subitizing 
literature.  When writing in 1989, Miller was unsure why the 1956 paper was so popular, 
compared to other work he had done.  
When my follow-up, 2001 article on item capacity limits (Cowan, 2001) was accepted for 
publication, the editor, Stevan Harnad, invited Miller to write a preamble to the article, but 
Miller, having focused on other topics after 1956, felt unwilling (and unqualified) to make a 
published statement.  He did, however, offer some striking observations in emails.  On 10 
January, 2000 he wrote:   
 
Nice to hear from you and to learn that 7 is still of interest. As you know, I have not been 
working on short-term memory problems or absolute judgment for many years.  I have only 
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occasionally commented  on it when someone who apparently hadn't read it over-
generalized the conclusions--I had an interesting interaction with the billboard industry 
during the Ladybird Johnson era, which made me revisit the topic briefly... More recently, 
Steve Malinowsky put it up on his web site and I had an excuse to read it once again.  I had 
rather dismissed the paper, assuming that its notoriety was attributable to the amusing idea 
of putting a confidence interval around a magical number.  But on rereading I decided that, 
even after all these years, it was a good piece of work.  I think there is some art in it, as well 
as ideas. 
 
To my further surprise and delight, after reading my in-press target article, Miller (on 11 January, 
2000) magnanimously indicated that he liked it and, further, was not surprised by the 
discrepancy between my finding and his own in 1956.  He said:    
 
I have now had a chance to read your BBS article.  I think it is great!  There were some 
ideas I thought you might have missed, but you didn't.  A good job…Herb Simon used to 
say "George had the right idea, but the wrong number."  I think Herb favored 3.  I never 
argue with Herb Simon.  I was aware, even in 1954 when I was writing my invited address, 
that the running memory span was only about 4, and my introspections convinced me that 
the 7 that was standard on the intelligence tests at that time must have been a hooking 
together of a rehearsed initial segment with a final segment from what Nancy Waugh used to 
call the "echo box."  But I was stuck with 7 because of the absolute judgment results (the 
first half of the article that people forget). 
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Miller went on to explain about his autobiographical chapter (Miller, 1989) and with great humor 
indicated that “that is how I came to own the number 7.”  Continuing, he explained his 
perspective on the field after 1956:   
 
Since 1956, of course, my attention has wandered off in many other directions.  As I recall it 
now, my interest was in the use of chunking to surmount the limits of short-term memory, 
but everyone else wanted to fight about the size of the limit, or whether there was any limit 
at all--questions of little interest to me.  I was happy to let Alan Baddeley claim the 
stage…Now I am delighted that you have slogged through the accumulated "literature" and 
produced a thoughtful, well-organized interpretation.  I have nothing more to add to what 
you have said so well.  Congratulations… 
 
The field thus gravitated toward time limits and away from item (or chunk) limits for many years 
after Miller (1956).  To lend further perspective to how the field changed throughout the years 
following Miller’s article, it is interesting to examine the changing views of Herb Simon, the 
1978 winner of the Nobel Prize in economics whom Miller mentioned in his correspondence to 
me.  Simon (1974) was one of very few early articles illustrating the limit in working memory to 
just several chunks regardless of their size.  Simon later served as one of about 8 peer reviewers 
of my article (Cowan, 2001) when it was first evaluated, and signed his review.  Now, 
publication in Behavioral and Brain Sciences requires that the thesis be controversial enough to 
serve as a good basis for many following commentaries and my work met that criterion, I 
believe, because the reviewers radically differed.  Whereas several reviewers thought that my 
conclusion was not newsworthy because it was already known, several others, including Simon, 
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thought that I was wrong and that there was no clearly identifiable item limit.  I was surprised 
that Simon seemed to be departing from the view in his 1974 article that favored fixed limits.  I 
now wonder whether Simon might have lost enthusiasm for that view in part because his and 
Miller’s early work was met by such a dearth of follow-up studies on capacity limits.  
Why Was Miller (1956) Revered and Passed Over at the Same Time? 
 I have touched on at least three possible reasons why Miller’s famous article did not 
engender a groundswell of research into item capacity limits that one might expect in the 
immediately following years.  (1) For one thing, the limit seemed to depend on circumstances or 
task demands in ways that were not understood.  Therefore, it was not clear that there was any 
fixed limit to be examined.  (2) Also, the more important contribution of Miller (1956) was 
probably his observation that measurement of information in bits so popular in the engineering 
world could not explain human (as opposed to computer) working memory limits.  Instead, what 
mattered for humans was the number of coherent, meaningful units in mind, or what has become 
known as chunks. This observation was clear and practically self-evident, with few researchers 
disputing it, so the case seemed settled.  (3) Last, Miller juxtaposed descriptions of several very 
different item-related limits.  He began with the tongue-in-cheek complaint that he was being 
persecuted by an integer and concluded with the coy statement that he suspected the similarity 
between the phenomena he discussed to be no more than “a pernicious, Pythagorean 
coincidence.” Scientists shy away from topics that could make them the butt of a joke (e.g., cold 
fusion), so research on possible real commonalities between the phenomena was thereby 
discouraged, inadvertently I would assume. 
The Case for Returning to Research on the Topics of Miller (1956) 
 Each of the reasons why not much research was done on the specific topics Miller 
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described leads me to a response about how vital that endeavor actually is.   
(1) First is the notion that item capacity limits just depend on circumstances.  I have tried 
to establish that meaningful sets of boundary conditions can in fact be found (Cowan, 2001).  
Consider that telephone numbers around the world typically contain 6 to 10 digits, but consider 
also that the numbers are divided into groups of 2 to 4 digits.  When attention must be focused on 
an ensemble of items all at once, the limit seems severe, in the range of about 3 for adults.  The 
field now argues about whether the capacity limit is a matter of there being a fixed number of 
items in working memory or, instead, whether the capacity limit resembles a fluid resource that 
can be spread thinly over all stimulus items, sometimes too thinly to contribute to the necessary 
response for all items (Ma et al., 2014). Now, at least, the issue is finally seen as an intensely 
interesting and tractable one to investigate (largely following a groundbreaking article by Zhang 
& Luck, 2008). 
(2) Next is the sentiment that the process of chunking is self-evident.  Although that may 
well be the case, the issue of capacity limits cannot be solved until the actual chunks that people 
form and use can be consistently identified across many situations.  Therefore, it can be argued 
that effort should be invested in trying to find out if capacity is a constant number of identified 
chunks (cf. Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet & Clarkson, 2004).  This generally has seemed too 
difficult for the field and, what is more, time limits of working memory probably have seemed 
simpler, to such an extent that one might believe that only time limits, without item limits, could 
explain working memory performance (cf. Baddeley, 1986).  However, one can sometimes 
observe either apparent time limits or apparent item limits, depending on whether verbal 
rehearsal of the material has been curtailed (Chen & Cowan, 2009).      
(3) Last, people were probably discouraged from exploratory research by Miller’s (1956) 
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comment that the commonality between the tasks he observed was probably due to a 
coincidence.  In fact, though, there are good reasons to suspect that common principles may be at 
work across all three of the phenomena that Miller described (immediate memory of lists, 
absolute identification of stimuli, and estimation of small numbers of items).  The reasons are as 
follows. 
Absolute judgment is one of the simplest tasks imaginable and seems like a process that 
is often carried out in ordinary life.  A single stimulus is delivered to the research participant, 
who only needs to decide to which of several pre-taught categories the stimulus belongs.  The 
apparent simplicity of the task does not, however, ensure that the mental processes are in fact 
that simple.  Holland and Lockhead (1968) offered evidence on the absolute judgment of tone 
loudness indicating that these judgments are made with respect to previous trials.  To judge the 
tone on Trial N, the tones presented on Trial N-1 had an assimilative effect:  when N-1 had been 
more intense it made the tone on Trial N seem louder, as well; and vice versa.  The previous few 
tones instead had a small contrast effect: when these tones had been more intense they made the 
tone on Trial N seem quieter and vice versa.  The effect seemed to extend back to about Tone N-
5, in the range of Miller’s magic number.  Although the mechanism of these effects is still 
debatable, it appears that across trials the task involves a list from the participant’s point of view, 
and the sequential effects are subject to something akin to the usual working memory constraints.  
Similarly, Siegel and Siegel (1972, Figure 2) showed that when feedback was given, there was a 
large effect of the number of trials intervening between the stimulus on Trial N and the trial in 
which that same stimulus was last presented, again in the range of several items.  These, 
however, were isolated investigations and it is only recently that a model of absolute judgment 
has been proposed, incorporating working memory effects (Brown, Marley, Donkin, & 
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Heathcote, 2008).  Recent research also has finally overcome the notion that absolute 
identification of objects on a simple continuum cannot be improved through training; it can if 
participants can find a way to link the judgment to some stable frame of reference, somewhat 
analogous to how immediate memory can be improved through the application of knowledge for 
chunk formation.  Several recent studies on training of absolute judgment have been quite 
successful (Dodds, Donkin, Brown, & Heathcote, 2011; Rouder, Morey, Cowan, & Pfaltz, 
2004).   
Rapid enumeration of small clusters of items, the third topic described by Miller (1956), 
also may rely on similar working-memory mechanisms.  In one version of working memory 
theory, the item capacity limit is identified with the capacity of the human focus of attention and 
how many objects can be attended at once (Cowan, 2001).  The hallmark of small-set 
enumeration, or subitizing, is that the items must be attended and individuated – perceived as 
separate objects – within a short period.  The typical limit in the literature is not about 7 as in the 
suggestion of Miller, but on the order of 3 or 4 as in the literature on memory for items in an 
array (Luck & Vogel, 1997), and performance levels on the two tasks are highly correlated and 
appear to share a common limited-capacity resource (Piazza, Fumarola, Chinello, & Melcher, 
2011).   
The Subsistence and Revival of Chunk Capacity Limits 
It would be too extreme to say that all research on item and chunk capacity limits ceased 
after Miller’s 1956 article.  As an analogy, although behaviorism had an inhibiting effect on 
research on mental mechanisms, such research did not totally cease during that era. There were, 
likewise, important studies involving item or chunk capacity limits in the years following Miller 
(e.g., Broadbent, 1975; Graesser & Mandler, 1978; Simon, 1974; Tulving & Patkau, 1962; 
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Waugh & Norman, 1965; Zhang and Simon, 1985). As I (Cowan, 2001) have previously pointed 
out, there were also a number of other works that assumed a limited capacity as part of a larger 
model of cognitive processes, just without a primary focus on the assumed capacity limit and 
without an independent, direct evaluation of it (e.g., the seminal work of Atkinson & Shiffrin, 
1968). Thus, I think that the work on chunk capacity limits was stymied, but not halted, by 
Miller’s humorous presentation. 
When it was suggested that much of working memory has a time limit (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974; Brown, 1958; Peterson & Peterson, 1959), that concept easily predominated in the 
field, a fact that I attribute largely to the weakness of support in that era for basic item or chunk 
limits. Indeed, my recollection is that for many years, sophisticated researchers tended to hold 
the opinion that, although the number of items in working memory is somehow limited, the limit 
just depends on the circumstances in a complex way that cannot easily be pinned down.  
Naturally, such opinions did not result in many publications articulating that view, which 
basically says that we don’t know enough to begin to measure a capacity limit expressed in 
chunks.  That is clearly a view that was held by a number of the initial critical reviewers of 
Cowan (2001), and by some of the published commentaries included in that work.   
In the mid-1970s, the field rather readily adopted Baddeley’s general assumption that a 
time limit took the place of an item limit (cf. Barrouillet, Portrat, & Camos, 2011; Case, Kurland, 
& Goldberg, 1982), with apparent item limits emerging indirectly, because of time limits (e.g., 
Schweickert & Boruff, 1986).  Beginning with my graduate training starting in 1974, I, too, 
focused mostly on time limits, but my reading in the field led me to a nagging sense that 
different people were saying things that badly conflicted with one another, given the stark 
difference between item- and time- limited effects. The question for me was whether both kinds 
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of limits could have validity.  I thought they could, suggesting (Cowan, 1988, p. 166):  
 
“Estimates of short-term storage capacity may be inflated by contributions of the 
long-term store. To obtain pure estimates of short-term storage, some investigators (e.g., 
Glanzer & Razel, 1974; Watkins, 1974) have subtracted out the assumed contribution of 
long-term storage. The resulting estimate for adults is two or three items in short-term 
storage. Perhaps the number of activated memory items is limited to about seven, 
whereas the subset of these items in awareness and voluntary attention is limited to two 
or three...Other researchers (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975; Schweikert & 
Boruff, 1986) have suggested that verbal short-term memory is limited in the duration of 
storage as well as the number of items. When the list contains no organizing cues and 
rote rehearsal must he used, subjects appear able to recall as much as they can rehearse in 
1.5-2.0 s. (This duration does not necessarily estimate simple memory decay, because the 
process of rehearsing or recalling one part of a sequence could interfere with memory for 
another part.) Thus, there appear to be constraints in both the number of items and the 
duration of pronounceable sequences in short-term storage. Although it is not clear how 
these two constraints work together, it might be possible to retain up to two or three 
chunks nonverbally while rehearsing other information (cf. Zhang & Simon, 1985). At 
least, some studies (Brooks, 1968; Scarborough, 1972) suggest that there are separate 
verbal and nonverbal components of short-term memory that can be used together.”   
 
This kind of dual, item-plus-time-limit approach seems to have some validity (e.g., Cowan, 
Lichty, & Grove, 1990; Chen & Cowan, 2009), though both kinds of limits must be 
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painstakingly disentangled from interference effects (Cowan, Saults, & Blume, 2014; Oberauer, 
Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves, 2012; Ricker & Cowan, 2014). 
In the 1970s through the 1990s, personally it felt all right to have item capacity limits in 
the background, but I sometimes felt ridiculed if these capacity limits were foregrounded in 
conversation.  For example, the feeling of ridicule sometimes came up in conversations at a 
conference at the University of Colorado in 1997 that resulted in a book of conflicting theoretical 
viewpoints (Miyake & Shah, 1999).  The conference also gave me encouragement, though, as I 
could see that (1) views on working memory were quite disparate, (2) some researchers agreed 
with me about the existence of chunk capacity limits, and (3) I was able to make some headway 
in convincing others and refining my own views.  The conference helped in the formulation of 
the 2001 article in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, though I felt scorn from a number of 
reviewers. The feeling subsided when the paper was accepted, albeit by a journal that thrived 
upon controversy. 
Baddeley (1994) correctly pointed out that Miller (1956) did have the profound effect of 
ending a general quest, in the early formative years of cognitive psychology: a quest to explain 
human limits in terms of the bits (binary choices) of information theory.  Miller argued that bits 
were not the basic units of immediate memory; meaningful chunks were.  While disproving bit 
limits, however, item and chunk limits were not explored and pinned down nearly as much as I 
would have expected and hoped, until the recent research boom in that area.   
Concluding Remarks:  Lessons for the Progress of Science 
Talk about things being pernicious (Miller, 1956); one of the most important constraints 
that science faces is the restriction of topics that individual scientists pursue.  They place these 
restrictions on themselves because they do not wish to be perceived in a manner that would hurt 
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their careers, discourage funding, or make them seem foolish or laughable.  These concerns are 
not without a basis in reality.  For example, in accounts of the career of Judah Folkman, who 
pioneered the well-accepted theory of the angiogenesis of tumors, he was laughingstock whose 
findings were often thoughtlessly dismissed until the theory was finally accepted [Newsweek, 28 
January, 2008, A quiet hero in the cancer war:  Dr. Judah Folkman, 74.] It is important for 
reviewers to try to be open-minded to unconventional ideas, albeit without lowering the bar for 
the requirement of solid evidence.  George Miller was a humble man who never would have 
dreamed that his article would become so important, nor that the entertaining manner in which it 
was presented might discourage others from pursuing the basic phenomena described within. 
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